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Action Research – Applied Research,  
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This article relates common ways of conceptualising action research as 
“intervention”, “collaboration”, “interactive research”, “applied research”, 
and “practitioner research” to a number of different ways of knowing, ex-
tracted from the works of Aristotle. The purpose is not to disavow any of 
these practices but to expand the philosophical, methodological, and theo-
retical horizon to contain the Aristotelian concept of praxis. It is claimed 
that praxis knowing needs to be comprehended in order to realize the full, 
radical potential in action research providing real “added value” in relation 
to more conventional social research approaches. Praxis knowing radically 
challenges the divisions of labour between knower-researchers and the 
known-researched. Thereby it also challenges both the epistemologies and 
institutionalisations dominating both conventional research and conven-
tional ways of conceptualising action research. 
Key words: action research, collaborative research, intervention research, 
practitioner research, praxis, ways of knowing 
 
In this article I will address different ways of conceptualising action research 
according to how it seems to relate to its field or subject of study. Different 
conceptualisations do not necessarily imply radically different or incompati-
ble practices. But despite practical similarities between action research 
schools and individual researchers, conceptualisations differ, creating some-
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times fruitful tensions and sometimes confusion, partly because the differ-
ences may often be more terminological than really conceptual. Often the 
practices of action researchers are better than their conceptualisations of what 
they do. But these differences need to be discussed. Hopefully, the following 
contribution will help to clarify some conceptual and terminological differ-
ences and similarities that might decrease confusion, but at the same time 
increase fruitful differences and tensions. 
Many action research approaches use terms like “intervention” and “col-
laboration” or “interactivity” in describing their ways of doing things and 
how they relate to their field of study, and / or they think of their activity as a 
form of “applied research”, applying either research methods or research 
results to interpret or guide practical development work. Among the “inter-
ventionists” we find people like Argyris (1970; 1985), Engeström (2004), 
Rapaport (1987). Traditions at the Work Research Institute (WRI) in Oslo 
and at the ISEOR in Lyon often talk about intervening, and so, of course, do 
explicit “intervention researchers” who normally do not call themselves 
action researchers but still have many things in common with certain forms 
of action research (cf. Rothman & Thomas, 1994; Fraser et al., 2009).1 
Others, like Greenwood and Levin (1998) emphasise some form of collabora-
tion between researchers and practitioners, and so do many from the Norwe-
gian WRI-tradition (B.Gustavsen and others) and in the UK within CARN (J. 
Elliott and others) and CARPP (P.Reason and others). Swedish researchers 
(Svensson, Ellström, & Brulin, 2007) prefer to talk about “interactive re-
search”, while Eden & Huxham (1996) and others seem to prefer to talk 
about action research as “applied research”.2 
Terms like these can, of course, have many different meanings in different 
contexts. Some are relevant, others irrelevant for action research purposes. 
                                           
1  Intervention researchers and action researchers have a common ancestry through 
quasi-experimental research and the action research of Kurt Lewin (cf. Campbell, 
1978). 
2  Each of the contributions in this issue of IJAR have one of the approaches in my 
discussion as its point of departure; Shani, Coghlan & Cirella, the collaborative per-
spective, Savall, Zardet, Péron & Bonnet, the interventionist perspective, Schaenen, 
Kohnen, Flinn, Saul & Zeni, the practitioner perspective. 
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Although sometimes the emphasis is on one term more than on others, the 
different terms may, of course, be quite compatible and not in any way 
contradictory or contrary to each other. This could indicate that the differ-
ences are mostly terminological or simply designate different aspects of a 
complex practice. In action research and social research more generally, 
however, terms like these do presuppose a distinction between “insiders”, 
usually thought of as the practitioners immersed in the social field concerned 
as objects of change or study (organisations, communities, families, individu-
als, etc.), and “outsiders”, mostly researchers, consultants, therapists, educa-
tionalists, or social workers whose institutional base and primary practices 
are not defined as “existentially” enmeshed in the specific field of some 
particular “insiders”. Although generally defined in relation to some “clients” 
as “insiders”, the outsiders happen to collaborate with and / or intervene in the 
social world and practices of specific “insiders”. They come and go with 
limited change projects and methods. But still the outsiders’ perspective defines 
the terminology. Insiders and outsiders may collaborate in planning and im-
plementing some form of change or problem solving project where normally 
and somehow the outsiders claim to contribute with applied research methods, 
scientific theory, or “results of research” in justifying their collaboration with, 
and intervention into, the lives of the insider practitioners or natives. This 
means, however, that there may still be many “othering effects” (Eikeland, 
2006) connected to research conceptualised in these ways.3 
Let me reveal at once that I am not quite satisfied with this way of con-
ceptualising, or this terminology, if that is all there is to it. It tends to exclude, 
conceal, or even distort what I believe must be core elements and potentials 
in action research considered primarily from an epistemological, learning, 
and knowledge generating perspective, but subsequently and ultimately even 
from a practical point of view. It is important to note, however, that my 
scepticism does not imply that either intervention or collaboration or interac-
tivity should or could currently (and maybe ever) be avoided. Current (and 
                                           
3  This whole constellation is, of course, challenged by the fact that so many employees 
in “ordinary” work life have university degrees themselves, by the fact that all ad-
vanced work life enterprises are striving to become learning organisations which also 
do their own research (cf. Eikeland, 2009). 
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maybe even any) institutionalisation of research and knowledge generation 
makes them all unavoidable. Still, we need other ways of conceptualising 
action research and knowledge generation and application more generally; 
ways that are not dependent on the insider-outsider distinction and its implied 
divisions of labour. 
More generally, there is a constant tension in modern mainstream social 
research between “theory” and “practice” that has to do with how institution-
alised divisions of labour and corresponding research techniques and con-
cepts frame and restrict our thinking about and our relationships to the field 
or subject of study. We are all, to some extent, positioned within and hence 
practical prisoners of extant institutions and divisions of labour. But although 
practically dominated by existing institutions and divisions of labour, we 
don’t have to let our thinking be imprisoned and dominated in the same way, 
quasi-essentialising the current segregations and divisions. Other, more 
implicit aspects of our common practice can be brought to the fore methodol-
ogically and theoretically. In order to conceptualise or theorise in ways that 
transcend both existing divisions of labour and corresponding attempts to 
mediate or “bridge” between the divisions and opposites implied without 
changing their basic relations, the discussion will be better served by taking 
as its starting point a more basic theory of knowledge, or gnoseology 
(broader in scope than epistemology) (cf. Eikeland, 2007). 
Similarities and differences between terms and concepts of “intervention”, 
“collaboration”, “interactivity”, “application” and what we may think of as 
“development” (unfolding implicit, emergent tendencies), may be clarified by 
relating these concepts to different ways of knowing extracted from Aristotle, 
which I will present below (cf. Eikeland, 1997, 1998, 2006b, 2008). The 
philosophy of Aristotle provides other ways of conceptualising knowledge 
generation and application which are not dependent on the insider-outsider 
distinction and its implied divisions of labour. But the main purpose of this 
text is not to disavow “intervention”, “collaboration” and similar terms or 
practices but to provoke reflection and open the theoretical space for explor-
ing praxis-research. These most commonly used terms just mentioned do not 
open this reflective theoretical space sufficiently, since they all seem to 
presuppose the institutionalised division of labour and do not incorporate 
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reflections on the Aristotelian concept of praxis. Hence, my text is a call for 
more distinctions and thereby more distinction in our thinking.  
It is my claim, then, that it is both possible and desirable to do action re-
search as praxis-research in ways that transcend “intervening”, “collaborat-
ing”, “interacting”, and “applying” mainstream research methods and scien-
tific theory, as a dialectical “Aufhebung” of these terms and practices. A 
dialectical “Aufhebung” of something is not the same as simply leaving the 
transcended something behind, deconstructing, cancelling, and abandoning it. 
Aufhebung means transcending, retaining, transforming, and improving at the 
same time, literally; to raise something to a new level, mainly by recontextu-
alising it. This can be done by rethinking these terms within a comprehended 
praxis-research framework. 
Several forms of what is often termed “practitioner”, “native”, or “in-
sider” research: where the tasks of knowledge generation and research are 
done by people from within the different vocations, professions, organiza-
tions, and practical pursuits themselves, seem to be on the trail of praxis-
research, but often with insufficient philosophical reflection and sometimes 
apparently reducing the task of action research to problem solving and im-
proving practice, without explicit and clear theoretical ambitions (McNiff & 
Whitehead, 2011). Praxis-research may require practitioner-research. But, 
still, not all forms of practitioner research qualify as praxis-research, as when 
practitioners merely apply conventional research methods (observing the 
behaviour of others, reading documents, and asking questions). Practitioner-
research may be necessary but still not sufficient for praxis-research. As I 
have tried to clarify elsewhere, even within what might be called informed 
Aristotelian praxis-research there are important differences which, although 
there is no space for it here, need to be addressed.4 My presentation here may 
                                           
4  My own reconstruction of Aristotle differs from the most current “applied” way of 
presenting Aristotle on knowing by separating epistêmê from tékhnê and phrónêsis (cf. 
Flyvbjerg, 2001; Toulmin, 1996a, 1996b, 1996c, 2001; Schwandt, 2002; Ramírez, 
1995; Dunne, 1993; Polkinghorne, 2004). The separation is usually done in order to 
emphasize phrónêsis as an independent alternative to epistêmê and tékhnê, or to “sci-
ence” and “technology”. Phrónêsis is seen as deliberation connected to praxis, inter-
preted as approximately our everyday activities, contrasted to science and technique. 
Often, rhetoric is also mustered as the deliberative rationality most appropriate for 
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be seen as an extension of the argument outlined in Eikeland & Nicolini 
(2011) as a call for more research done by knowers studying their own 
practice, not merely the practices of others, and not merely for practical 
purposes but even theoretical (in a certain sense). 
Action research has a historical ancestry, broadly and coarsely in philoso-
phical pragmatism (e.g. Greenwood & Levin, 1998), critical theory (Carr & 
Kemmis, 1986), experimentalism (Kurt Lewin), and political activism (Col-
lier, 1945). Although it exceeds the frames of this text to do so, differences 
and similarities in ancestry between action research and quasi-
experimentalism need to be clarified on the one hand, and between action 
research and political activism on the other hand. Differences between critical 
theory and pragmatism also need to be addressed (cf. Papastephanou, 2012). 
Simultaneously, the “internal” action research differences and similarities 
between intervention research, applied research, collaborative and interactive 
research, and native research need to be listed and discussed. 
The different action research ancestries are “negatively” united in their 
dissatisfaction with a disengaged, contemplative, and / or spectator based 
concept of social science and with research feigning value neutrality and zero 
practical “reactivity”. “Positively” they are united in their demand for more 
practically conscious and relevant research versions. Although keeping a 
“critical distance” is often seen as a necessary premise for objectivity in 
much explanation and prediction, a common premise for the dissatisfaction is 
that doing research at a distance is insufficient, irrelevant, and even distorting 
and invalidating. But pure partisan research subordinating and restricting 
knowledge generation explicitly to what is immediately “useful” for some 
externally defined cause is hardly a viable alternative to disengaged spectator 
research. So, other forms and ways of attaining and maintaining “critical 
                                           
everyday practice, in the attempt to transcend modern reductionist science. This inter-
pretation is not mine (cf. Eikeland, 1997, 1998, 2006b, 2008). Epistêmê cannot be 
equated with modern science. There are differences both in kind and of degree only, 
within the Aristotelian epistêmê, and theoretical and practical philosophy cannot really 
be segregated the way these interpreters do. The concept of praxis, on the other hand, 
is much more specific than our everyday activities. It is also much more specific than 
most modern hybrid concepts of “practice”. But still different aspects of praxis must 
be distinguished even in its specialized Aristotelian sense. Cf. below. 
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distance” without externalised segregation need to be distinguished and 
developed.  
For both relevance and validity reasons, then, a more engaged and in-
volved research is promoted by action researchers. But it is worth reminding 
ourselves that the old experimentalism of Francis Bacon (1620), basic to 
modern natural science, shared the dissatisfaction with “contemplative” 
science, albeit mainly directed at a medieval scholastically insulated and 
speculative natural science. Even the behaviourism of the 20th century shares 
a similar dissatisfaction, however (cf. Lattal & Laipple, 2003; Marr, 2003). 
Many of the dissatisfied are simply interested in “what works”, or in what is 
immediately “useful”. In order to find out, they squeeze, bend, break, cut, 
stretch, and twist “mother nature” as recommended by Bacon, i.e. they 
interfere and intervene in natural processes and apply different treatments to 
detect cause-effect relationships, to really see experimentally “what works”. 
They search for results and recommendations like “apply x as a cause / 
stimulus and y will follow as an effect / response, apply a, and b will follow”, 
etc. Since most action researchers feel quite alien to both experimental natu-
ral science and behaviourism, however, it seems useful to rehearse and sort 
out how such dissatisfactions, in one way united against what John Dewey 
(1929) called “a spectator theory of knowledge”, still differ between them-
selves. Several contrary and even contradictory things may “work”, and they 
may work in quite different ways. There are many ways of inducing changes 
in people’s behaviour, not all of which are equally recommendable. Hence, 
there may be quite different ways for research as well to be involved, en-
gaged, useful, or practice based and directed, engendering different kinds of 
knowledge, and with equally different ethical and political implications. 
With Kurt Lewin, action research grew in the 1940s and 1950s from ex-
perimental and quasi-experimental social research as an answer to both 
validity and relevance challenges. John Dewey’s pragmatism and promotion 
of democracy was also an important source of inspiration at an early stage, 
still within an experimental interpretive horizon. Later, especially since the 
1970s, political activism, critical theory, phenomenology and hermeneutics, 
feminism, and post-modernism have become prominent inspirational sources. 
Hence, over the years, it has gradually become increasingly clear that its 
16 Olav Eikeland 
   
different ancestries have given rise to different ways of conceptualising and 
practising action research. What, then, constitutes the unity of action re-
search, not merely “negatively” but “positively”? Although, over the last 20 
years, action researchers have emerged as an international community of 
people communicating among themselves and “united” in what they are 
against (e.g. Reason & Bradbury, 2001), there are basic internal differences 
that need to be addressed and developed; differences that can still be con-
tained as non-antagonistic. 
The whole idea of intervention has a long history. Before the famous say-
ing accredited to Kurt Lewin that “in order to understand something you have 
to change it”, similar ideas were held by Aristotle, Hegel, and American 
pragmatists, while the most famous and influential proponents of this idea 
have, of course, been Francis Bacon and Karl Marx. Most have somehow 
been inspired by modern experimental natural science as a starting point for 
the approach. But, as pointed out by Hanna Arendt (1958), inspired by Aris-
totle, and continued by Jürgen Habermas (1971, 1973) there is an important 
difference between “technique” and “practice” which is not reflected in the 
tradition springing from experimental natural science but which is centrally at 
stake in the different conceptualisations of action research5. I return to Aris-
totle below. While “technique” and “engineering” is associated with interven-
tions, manipulations, and calculations, “practice” or praxis is different. 
What, then, are the differences, overlaps, and similarities, and, since the 
terms are often used uncritically and interchangeably, what ought to be 
rightfully observed and established as differences or similarities between 
intervention research, collaborative or interactive research, applied research, 
and practitioner research or native research. For example, intervention 
research may be inspired by the profession of medicine (as clinical) or by 
engineering (as social engineering) and by experimental research.  Different 
forms of collaborative research may be inspired by the emancipatory ideals of 
critical theory or by ideas of complementarity, interactive research by an 
exchange within clear and explicit divisions of labour, while others get their 
                                           
5  Cf. the discussion between Herbert Marcuse and Karl Popper (1971) about social 
engineering and critical theory in the 1970s. 
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original inspiration from other parts of the action research ancestry. But, 
often, the differences are not clearly defined or understood, and sometimes 
people will identify with several or all the designations without realising or 
recognising any significant tensions or differences between them. 
In my opinion, the differences between the approaches need to be clari-
fied, better defined, and emphasised, not in order to produce unnecessary 
antagonisms but in order for us all to better understand what is being done 
and the different ramifications of action research and “practice oriented” 
research more generally. We need these differences (and others) in order to 
think clearly, and even in order to combine compatible approaches. In my 
mind there is no doubt that for different “practical purposes” and occasions, 
all the different forms of action research: as interventions, as collaborations, 
or as applied social research, may be necessary and can be justified. My 
purpose, then, is not at all to say that interventions, collaborative relation-
ships, or ordinary research methods should be avoided or are insufficient for 
all purposes. Not even purely disengaged “spectator research” whether 
explanatory or interpretive, or explicitly manipulative technical research for 
that matter, can be discharged wholesale and uncritically for all occasions 
and purposes. In fact, modern societies make many different kinds of actions, 
knowledge, and research necessary in order to keep the social “machinery” 
going; and more often than not, we have to rest content with what is second 
best. Forms of knowledge and ways of knowing are closely and congruently 
connected to institutional and organizational arrangements. But that does not 
mean we have to conflate terms and concepts, or mistake one for the other to 
the confusion of all. 
I will maintain that at the most basic and radical level, action research 
needs to be understood as a special kind of practitioner or native research to 
be clarified below; as praxis research. This is what really renders or could 
render “value added” from action research in relation to other approaches. At 
this basic level and in this form, insider, native action research represents 
kinds of knowledge that cannot be neglected or overlooked even by totally 
different forms of research.  But although the differences between ways of 
knowing to be presented below cannot really or legitimately be neglected and 
overlooked, they often are, due to conceptual conflations and confusions; and 
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this negligence is part of our modern legacy. So, the different ways of know-
ing and forms of knowledge at stake need to be clarified and emphasised. The 
different forms of research presented above may all be necessary and profit-
able for particular purposes and occasions. But basic challenges concerning 
ways of knowing, knowledge forms, and their validity and relevance are 
normally not addressed and more often evaded and obscured by focusing too 
narrowly on so-called “practical purposes” and “usefulness” of research. It is 
my contention, then, that action research is not always and need not always 
be only praxis research, since it quite legitimately can be much more than just 
this. But without comprehending praxis it hardly qualifies as action research; 
it then misses the main point and can be reduced to other forms. 
Hence, this article will suggest why and how, theoretically and epistemo-
logically, understanding action research as a form of practitioner or native 
research, praxis research, based on practically acquired experience of the 
knowers involved, is necessary in order to overcome the deep split between 
“theory and practice” produced by a fundamentally contemplative, external-
ised, and spectator based epistemology and institutionalisation of modern 
social science, but also by technical approaches to action. Overcoming the 
split requires considerably more than individual and proclaimed changes in 
epistemology and methodology, however. It requires institutional, organisa-
tional, and practical changes in ways of doing things, individually and collec-
tively. But logically, step one is to show how it is possible and necessary to 
utilise the practically acquired experience of the knowers involved for theo-
retical purposes, and that such experience is actually always already presup-
posed in all forms of knowing (cf. Eikeland, 1997, 1998, 2008). The chal-
lenge is to make this basic experience-dependency conscious and visible, and 
then to integrate it adequately into the self-conceptualisation and practices of 
action research and of social research in general. 
By more adequately sorting the relations between intervention research, 
applied research, collaborative research, interactive research, and native 
research, it will become clearer how a radical practitioner, “insider”, or native 
action research challenges the modern institutionalisation of social research 
and knowledge production, based on invalidating divisions of labour in the 
production of social knowledge. But, as indicated, this challenge from radical 
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native ways of knowing does not only challenge modern social research from 
the outside. More significantly, it also challenges it from the inside, since 
“native ways of knowing” are subconsciously presupposed without being 
explicitly recognised, thematised, and reflectively integrated even within 
mainstream approaches to science. Mainstream researchers need to address 
their own implicit and presupposed “nativeness” (cf. Eikeland, 2006). By 
being thematised, however, the conscientisation of this core of native action 
research inside mainstream research can contribute to the transformation and 
improvement of mainstream social research. By mainstreaming action re-
search in this way, the split can be transcended (Aufgehoben). 
The radical foundation of action research in accumulated native practical ex-
perience needs to be expressed and transformed into practical measures, of 
course. This text does not allow me to pursue this fully, but I believe a broad and 
systematic development of organisational learning provides an important road 
ahead for realising this (cf. Eikeland & Berg, 1997; Eikeland, 2008a, 2012). 
Ways of knowing – knowledge forms 
Although I have presented Aristotelian knowledge forms and reasons for 
taking Aristotle as a point of departure before, I need to repeat (cf. e.g. Eike-
land, 2006b, 2008, 2009). Many typical validity challenges in modern re-
search methodology and philosophy of science are connected to specifically 
modern concepts of theory, methods, and experience (or “data”) and their 
institutional embeddedness. In order to solve or to dissolve the problems, 
these concepts must be transcended and transformed. In order to break the 
one-dimensionality of modernism, different ways of knowing need to be 
mustered and examined within a broader perspective on knowledge. I take 
the table below as my starting point for the following explanation. 
Table 1 presents ways of knowing extracted from the traditional Corpus 
Aristotelicum (cf. Eikeland, 1997, 1998, 2006b, 2008).6 Differently from 
modern epistemology, Aristotle’s theory of knowledge is a gnoseology, 
explicitly multidimensional, non-reductionist, and relational where epistêmê 
                                           
6  Cf. these works for references to the Corpus Aristotelicum 
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Table 1: Ways of knowing 
Basis Way of knowing Associated rationality English equivalent  
Aísthêsis 
(perception) 
Theôrêsis = epistêmê2 Deduction, demonstration, 
didactics 
Spectator speculation 
Páthos ?? Being affected passively 
from the outside 
Empeiría 
(practically 
acquired 
experience) 
Khrêsis Tékhnê (calculation) Using instruments 
Poíêsis Making, manipulating 
materials 
Praxis2 Phrónêsis (deliberation) Doing: virtuous perform-
ance, practical reasoning 
Praxis1 Dialectics / dialogue. The way 
from novice to expert, from tacit to 
articulate  
Practice, training for 
competence development 
and insight (theôría) 
Theôría = epistêmê1 Dialogue, deduction, deliberation Insight 
 
is split and takes a position among several other forms of knowledge. There 
is always a knower and something known involved, related to each other in 
specific and different ways that define ways of knowing; relationships that 
are also specifically required in order to acquire certain kinds of knowledge 
or competence. Certain relationships between means and ends specific to the 
different ways of knowing are also implied. As explicitly relational, the 
ethico-political implications of different ways of knowing are immediately 
brought to light as well, complicating considerably the modern ambition of 
keeping research “value neutral”. Ethics deals with relations between people, 
and the ethical aspects of the different relational knowledge forms, normally 
kept in the dark by modern ways of thinking, emerge when they are im-
planted among people; when some people know (about) others in the differ-
ent ways presented below. The relational starting point also shows how the 
different ways of knowing are impossible to reduce to one basic form differ-
ing merely in precision along one dimension. The different ways of knowing 
are mostly independent from each other (but with some important overlaps), 
with their own ways of acquisition, and with their own validity criteria. 
Hence, both the modernist unity-of-science dream of transforming and reduc-
ing all kinds of knowledge to one basic form and level, and the “post-
modernist” tendency to make all kinds of knowing indifferently valid or 
equivalent were alien to Aristotle. But his gnoseology allows for reconsider-
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ing and reintegrating ways of knowing: traditional, practical, tacit, emotional, 
experiential, intuitive, etc., marginalised and considered insufficient by 
modernist thinking. 
Theoretical and “scientific” ways of knowing 
Table 1 presents two concepts of theory and episteme, normally, but not quite 
adequately translated as “science”, one at either vertical extreme. In spite of 
fundamental differences, they share similarities making them both theoretical 
in an Aristotelian sense. They are both theoretical because the principles of 
movement, change, or development in the subjects studied reside in those 
subjects themselves, not in anyone or anything external to them. Things 
studied theoretically move, change, and develop by themselves, not because 
or as some external knower or manipulator makes them move or change. 
They move, change, and develop naturally, not artificially. We might say that 
the theoretical attitude is to respect the nature of what is studied. An Aristote-
lian theorist, then, is interested in knowing and understanding things “in 
nature” and “according to their nature”, without artificially altering them. 
This aspect unites both forms of theory, and separates them from the table’s 
intermediary non-theoretical knowledge forms. Still the two forms of theory 
should be kept apart. 
Theôrêsis 
The first form, called theôrêsis or epistêmê2, is based on non-intervening 
observation at a distance. Theôrêsis relates to external objects separate from 
the knower. It is based on aísthêsis or sense perception, or, rather, on a 
combination of knowledge from different sources; i.e. perceptual knowledge 
input (“data”) and knowledge from other (interpretive) sources producing 
educated conjectures (“theory”). The knower projects preconceived concepts 
and theory on to externalised observations, in order to predict or interpret 
movement, change, or behaviour in the objects observed. The relation im-
plied between knower and known is one of difference, distance, non-
interaction, and non-interference; sometimes because interference or inter-
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vention is impossible (as with remote stars) but equally often justified by the 
intent of studying things as they are naturally, in themselves, on their own. 
The intellectual movement, thinking, “down” in the theôrêsis model, from 
theory to “data”, experience, or practice, is primarily formal and deductive. In 
its deductive form, mathematised astronomy and physics have served as 
paradigms. For social and historical reasons (i.e. the rising success and social 
prestige of natural science), this paradigm gradually conquered the whole 
field of epistemology, science, and research from the 17th century on. At-
tempts at modelling knowledge generation in most fields on this example, 
have formed the institutions of modern science and research quite fundamen-
tally. Because of its status as basic scientific paradigm in the modern period, 
almost all philosophy of science and research methodology has made 
theôrêsis under different designations (like “covering law”, “hypothetico-
deductive” method / HDM) its starting point and framework (cf. e.g. Hack-
ing, 1983).  
Even interpretive or qualitative social research remains mainly within 
modified models of theôrêsis, although it normally does not formalise its 
theories and has long since expanded the repertoire of data collecting tech-
niques to include interviewing or questioning in different forms, generating 
“reactivity-“ or “interactivity-“ challenges (difficult to control) in its wake. In 
this model, the people studied by social research are still the others, not the 
actors-knowers themselves. The people active as knowers are the segregated 
researchers. The people studied and known are not active researchers or 
knowers in this relationship, hence the practices studied are not the knowers’ 
or researchers’ own practices but the others’. In order to approximate 
theôrêsis conditions and achieve this distant relationship conforming to its 
models, mainstream social science has resorted to an artificial separation of 
knower and known (disengagement) and an objectifying externalisation of the 
known. Although difficult to maintain, in these relations it is important not to 
intervene and disturb, and to neutralise any unintended effects (reactivity 
disturbing “natural activities” and distorting results) of the research activities. 
Although usually insufficiently separated from the other form of theory in 
table 1 (hence confusing and conflating the two, often throwing the baby out 
with the bath water), criticism of and opposition to this theôrêsis form of 
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theory and theoretical science is what unites most forms of action research 
and experimentalism. But keeping the two concepts of theory analytically 
apart makes it possible to avoid wholesale theory-scepticism and –rejection. 
It becomes possible to stay critical of this theôrêsis kind of theorising while 
retaining the second form below (theôría). Mainstream social research, how-
ever, in mostly abandoning experimentalism and action research and basing 
itself merely on reading, observing, and questioning, has remained within this 
broad ideal of uninvolved and intentionally uninfluential theory and science. 
The experiential base for theôrêsis is registered collections of “data” as 
bits of information or observations taken at face value. Its relationship to 
“data”: collecting them without influencing them,  is non-critical and non-
interventionist. There are, of course, many quite basic discussions complicat-
ing the simplistic concept of “data” used by theôrêsis, which every data-
collector should know but which cannot be dealt with here (cf. Eikeland, 
1985, 1995, 2006). The point here is, again, not to ban “data” from other 
forms of knowledge generation but just to emphasise that “data” represent 
one specific and limited form of experience, historically and principally 
springing from and connected to a specific and limited model of science (cf. 
e.g. Bonss, 1982). 
Generating theoretical explanations, moving “up” from “data” to theory, 
within theôrêsis is somewhat mystical and creative. Strictly inductive ap-
proaches (enumerative) have been abandoned logically since David Hume, 
and the abductive strategies (suggested by Ch.S.Peirce) attempting to make 
“inferences to the best explanation” have hardly advanced beyond educated 
guessing (conjectures). But according to Popper (1980) it does not matter 
from where and how you get your explanatory theoretical ideas. Theories are 
always hypothetical and merely required to provide falsifiable models 
(mathematical, graphical, physical, or linguistic) that may explain the data, 
i.e. predict the behaviour of the observed phenomena or events by deriving 
them logically from a theoretical scheme. The explanatory principle really 
consists in “saving the phenomena” instrumentally, by reducing or assimilat-
ing the data or explananda to an explanans or interpretans as something 
already and better understood, subsuming the data under theory as singular 
instances of something more general. But the real challenge of “theory plural-
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ism” indicating how an endless number of hypothetical theories (true and 
false) might validly produce (i.e. “explain”) a specific set of data as results, is 
not solved. 
Theôría 
But, with Aristotle, theôrêsis was not the only model for epistêmê, that is, for 
knowledge that was stabilised and pretty secure, about subjects that were for 
the most part or always stable and regular themselves. At the lower extreme 
of the table we find the other epistêmê form, which in certain ways represents 
the extreme, opposite knowledge form to the first. With Aristotle, not only 
what we normally consider sciences were forms of epistêmê. Boxing, music, 
grammar, orthography, medicine, and other skills and disciplines were also 
called epistêmê, because there was a certain patterned stability and regularity, 
a certain discipline, in what they represented. But this patterned regularity is 
different from modern “laws of nature” and their derivatives. 
In line with both Aristotle and Wittgenstein (1974), we may use grammar 
as the paradigm example for this other kind of epistêmê1 or theôría. Theôría 
translates as “insight”. In grammar the relation between the knower and the 
known is quite different from the corresponding relation in astronomy. 
Grammar is basically about ourselves as native speakers, proficient practitio-
ners, of a language. It expresses and organises certain aspects of our linguis-
tic practice; the more or less stable forms and patterns that repeat themselves 
in certain ways in our performance. Grammar is descriptive and analytical, 
but it is also normative, since it sets standards for correct speech and writing, 
describing topographies of language use. The basis for grammatical knowl-
edge is not primarily hypothetical conjectures about artificially collected 
singular “data” of sense perception observed from the outside and at a dis-
tance, but the practical competence, or patterns and structures (forms) in the 
acquired practical experience of the knower herself. Grammar primarily 
describes and analyses the linguistic practice of the knower, not that of 
strangers as “the others” known only or primarily observationally (as the 
stars) through collections of singular “data”. It is based on practically ac-
quired empeiría (= Erfahrung as accumulated practical experience exercised / 
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habituated into us, not Erlebnis as merely momentary experience); simulta-
neously descriptive and normative in the same way as grammar. There is no 
distance or separation between the knower and the known here, as there is 
between the researcher and the heavenly bodies in astronomy. In some sense, 
we are internal to grammar, or grammar is internal to us. 
This means that the subjects studied, our own forms of practice, must be ex-
tracted and “reified” reflectively in order to be grasped. They are not really 
outside us or outside our practices at all, the way stars are, and the way external 
nature is in general. In grammar, the knowers and the known are really the 
same. Hence, principles (common patterns, forms) of movement, change, and 
development still reside in the known (as required for theory); but also in the 
knower, simultaneously since the knower and the known coincide. 
In the astronomical theôrêsis, the principles of movement, change, and 
development are in the objects known (they move and change by them-
selves), but still outside the segregated knower (who, therefore, must project 
explanatory models and metaphors as conjectures on to the known as explan-
anda). As I return to below, the table’s in-between forms of khrêsis (using) 
and poíêsis (making) relate to external or externalised objects, as does 
theôrêsis, but not merely at a distance from a non-intervening spectator 
position. Khrêsis and poíêsis intervene actively in external objects as instru-
ments / tools used or as material formed respectively, making tools and 
materials move, change, or behave artificially. Hence, their “artificial” prin-
ciples of movement, change, and development are in the knower (as user or 
manipulator), but outside the known.  
Grammar coordinates aspects of our practice, and all language users, the 
practitioners, have the same relationship to grammar. We may be novices or 
experts in using the language and at different levels of tacitness or articula-
tion of the common forms. Our degree of initiation and expertise in a practice 
differs. But as practitioners and performers of an art, we have the grammar of 
the art or competence in common as performance standards we relate to. We 
relate to the grammar of our spoken language in the same way and as equals. 
Knowledge forms like grammar organise and structure the competence of 
their carriers, within a certain field or in general, and become primarily a 
qualification of their carriers themselves, individually and collectively. They 
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produce a specific habitus; a “grammatical” habitus, if you like. Collectively, 
they generate cultures and come to represent our culturally created “second 
nature” more and less habitually stable and regular. 
Praxis 
Grammar also exemplifies what in table 1 is called praxis knowledge, where 
the relationship between the starting point, the means, and the end or objec-
tive of our actions is one of formal equality. As in playing an instrument or in 
dancing, what we do as novices, what we do on our way to perfection, as 
means, and what we do as perfected virtuosos are all formally the same. The 
end or objective is entailed in the activity itself as its own perfection, making 
it autotelic (meaning: carrying its end or télos within itself). Hence praxis 
forms as activities, are in a sense, endless. Ars longa, vita brevis! As activi-
ties they are not merely formally different and limited technical means for 
external and separate ends, inserted between a starting point and an end point 
and stopped or put aside when the formally different aim is achieved. In 
praxis there are no technical or instrumental “methods” or “tools” formally 
different, delimited in-between, and separate from the starting point and the 
end. In perfecting a practice or in attempting to perform virtuously (as in 
acting courageously, fairly, or honestly), the aim and end is carried with and 
inside the activity. We dance or play our instrument all the time, all the way, 
but (hopefully, and preferably) we do it gradually better over time, even 
without ever becoming perfect. The general form of the activity, getting into 
the more or less perfected form, emerges as habitus, experience, and skill as 
we practice. Extracting and grasping the form or pattern in the practice 
constitutes the emergent concept. 
This, then, represents genuine development as unfolding implicit (poten-
tial), emergent forms and tendencies, different from instrumental and techni-
cal modern “practice” causing artificial changes in external(ised) objects as 
khrêsis and poíêsis. Praxis knowledge is the primary base for theôría. In 
contrast to theôrêsis (and to both khrêsis and poíêsis as well), praxis-based 
theôría is knowledge shared in common between thinking individuals 
through language. Praxis is shared or shareable as theôría. There is by defini-
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tion no praxis in relation to unthinking, non-sharing external or externalised 
objects, living or dead. Knowledge based in relations like these, even when 
inserted between human beings, of course, is transformed into and reduced to 
theôrêsis (spectatorship=speculation), khrêsis (use) or poíêsis (making, 
manipulating). Praxis and theôría is what is shared among communicating 
and equivalent minds, between colleagues as masters and apprentices, within 
cultural, professional, or republican, citizen (political) communities. 
Praxis, then, is insider, native, practitioner knowledge. For Aristotle, 
praxis knowledge represents a relationship between colleagues sharing 
common standards for how to go about their professional activities. But 
our common and equal relationship to practical standards even sets an 
ethical standard for practical political communities of equals, as it did in 
the ancient pólis-communities (albeit among adult native men only, but 
today we can delimit such communities of equals differently). Equally 
important; it sets a standard for a social and political science very differ-
ent from one based on theôrêsis, and from varieties based on technical 
interventions applying simple cause-effect relations. Praxis could and 
should also be explored as a gnoseological paradigm for a different form 
of organisational science, based on reflective practitioner research where 
the knowers-practitioners study and develop their own practice and com-
mon standards working as collegial coordinating principles. 
As indicated above, quite different things may all “work”. For exam-
ple, human beings, or parts of totalities more generally, may be coordi-
nated in quite different ways. The Aristotelian praxis-based concord or 
homónoia as being “practically of similar minds” sharing common under-
standings, consisting in and created through lógos or reasoned speech not 
only in face-to-face relations but within large linguistic and conceptual 
communities, seems to be ignored when social co-ordination is attempted 
reduced to secondary “mechanisms” like markets (trading and bartering), 
hierarchies (power) or networks (loyalty alliances) by Thompson et al. 
(1991).7 Praxis knowledge regulates, or organises, the relationships 
between equals. It constitutes and requires a “we” of peers, literally as a 
                                           
7  Cf. Eikeland (2008a: 399ff.) on “concord” or homónoia. 
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community with common standards of conduct and excellence and a 
common practical mastery and understanding (as in grammar), and it 
regulates relations among “us”. All those with an equal practical relation-
ship to,– i.e. striving to realize, articulate, and understand, the common 
standards make up the relevant “we” as a community while any thing or 
anyone who is “not one of us”: clients, tools, material for change, etc., is 
treated according to different standards. 
Methods – dialogue and phrónêsis 
Modern research methodology is a discipline like other arts, vocations, and 
professions in the sense of being a certain practice in which ones perform-
ance can improve by practice, guidance, and reflection approaching some 
common standards of conduct. As I have tried to indicate in other places (e.g. 
Eikeland, 2006), the modern discipline of research methodology must be 
understood basically as praxis constituting common knowledge for the 
insider natives within the community of research practitioners. Methodology 
as a discipline develops and refines the professional / vocational competence 
and insights of the researchers, in principle similarly to how other professions 
or communities of practice develop and refine theirs. Praxis thereby becomes 
positioned as an albeit mostly tacit core even of mainstream research. Like 
every vocation or profession, research has its ways and methods of initiation 
and performance through methodological competence. Other vocations and 
professions could and should actually imitate the articulateness of research 
methodology in developing their practice and understanding. 
What, then, are the methods of the discipline of methodology, how does 
methodology work; how do we improve our practice, insight, and discipline, 
clarifying, defining, and approximating standards of conduct and excellence, 
and how do we initiate novices for that matter? My contention (cf. Eikeland, 
2008c) is that methodology as a discipline develops in ways similar to the 
methods of native or practitioner research and philosophy. These are basi-
cally the same (merging philosophy, methodology, practitioner research, and 
empirical research).  
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For both Aristotle and Plato, moving “up” or “in” to an articulated insight 
in basic principles (common patterns, forms) of grammar or of any other 
fields of activity we relate to in similar ways, starting as novices and/or from 
how things appear to us phenomenologically here-and-now, goes through 
practice based critical dialogue or dialectics, sifting and sorting, gathering 
and separating (cf. Eikeland, 1997, 2008). By searching actively and criti-
cally for patterns in how we do things and how to do things competently, 
comparing and sorting similarities and differences in our accumulated practi-
cal experience (Erfahrung), and in how we use language in specific language 
games (Wittgenstein, 1953) and / or communities of practice (Wenger, 1998), 
dialogue helps articulate what we carry with us as habituated tacit knowl-
edge: our habitus. It also helps us on our way from novices to experts and to 
virtuoso performers. It helps the forms or patterns of our practices emerge in 
us and for us as it helps us perfect our practice, both in initiation and in 
exploration and inquiry. 
This dialogical articulation from within practice and practical experience 
is what is called praxis1 on the second lowest row in the table. It is inductive 
in a wide and non-enumerative sense, sifting and sorting similarities and 
differences “bottom-up” in acquired practical experience and ways of know-
ing, developing and distinguishing inchoate perceptions, unskilled fumbling, 
and mere habits into skills and insightful competence. Dialogue is a form of 
praxis in itself, common to all other forms, even to the knower side of the 
split non-practical knowledge forms in the table (e.g. among colleagues of 
spectators or manipulators). Our own practices, as with grammar, we articu-
late and make explicit as reflectively extracted and abstracted patterns and 
forms from the inside out, as natives from inside the phenomena, as genera-
tors of phenomena. Hence the way to principal insight is not mystical here as 
it is with theôrêsis. It goes via the gradual and practical development of 
habits, habitus, and emerging experience into virtue or virtuosity, mastery, 
and to insight or theôría. 
Critical dialogue needs relief from immediate pressure to act, however. 
The articulation of emerging insights is a task of its own in need of leisure 
from the exigencies of immersion in substantial practices. Leisure is skholê in 
ancient Greek, the word that afterwards became “school” in most European 
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languages. But the original skholê was not an ordinary school as we moderns 
normally understand it, independent and mostly segregated from practical 
contexts. It was primarily a space for reflection interspersed in practical 
contexts constituted as necessary breaks for practitioners. It was neither a 
didactic didaskaleíon for instructive teaching nor an external observatory or 
“theôretêrion”. Thus, skholê, in its original sense at the beginning of the 
European intellectual endeavour (imported from the practice of craft commu-
nities), as a reflective relief from immediate immersion in some practice for 
“bending back” and grasping its form and pattern, provides an alternative 
“critical distance” from within practice for reflective reification of patterns in 
our own practices through critical dialogue, not as an external and segregated 
observatory for outsiders (non-practitioners / spectators). 
In theôría, the thinking way down and out from “theory” to “practice” is 
also different. With grammar the practical enactment is often spontaneous in 
fluent and proficient speakers. We usually do not think twice before speak-
ing, and we sometimes act as if we were merely acting according to given 
rules, recipes, precepts, and prescriptions. But mechanical , machine-like and 
inconsiderate, rule-following is not proper praxis. Praxis is defined in rela-
tion to its own internal standard of perfection (as skill and performance), 
maybe never or only momentarily fully attained in concrete action. In other 
more complex fields where the practice is not equally standardised and 
“automated”, for example in ethics, the “application” of general competence 
or knowledge of principles provided by virtues like justice, courage, friendli-
ness, and honesty, needs discretion and deliberation, i.e. practical reasoning 
or phrónêsis, trying to find out how to act in the most just, fair, or reasonable 
way towards someone here and now. There are no fixed rules or precepts for 
knowing when the kairos or right moment arrives and for exploiting it in 
hitting target in action, acting for the right reasons, at the right time, towards 
the right people, in the right way, taking all things relevant into consideration. 
Core areas for praxis need deliberation in action. 
In order to realize itself as praxis, then, practicing for perfection needs to 
be more than just drill. It needs critical dialogue and skholê on “the way up”, 
developing from the incompetence of novices and unanalysed particulars into 
general competence and professional understanding. On “the way down” 
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from acquired competence, “applying” or enacting it performatively, it needs 
deliberative phrónêsis for the proper discretion and consideration of particu-
lars. This way down is what is called praxis2 in table 1. Hence, the transition 
from theôría to practice within this kind of knowledge is not deductive, nor 
does it go by some form of application of merely material and efficient 
causes and technical calculation of effects. It is, and was intended by Aris-
totle to be, deliberative, clarifying ends, reasons, and justifications for com-
municating minds (peers, colleagues), not rigorously deductive or calculative 
based on strictly formalised knowledge and simple efficient causal connec-
tions. 
Intermediate, technical ways of knowing 
Praxis, then, is not primarily defined in relation to external products, to 
material, or to instruments but in relation to internal standards of conduct for 
an activity. Although there is a praxis aspect to all the other forms in the table 
as well (since they are all constituted as communities of colleagues or of 
practice living in the span between fumbling, inchoate beginners and per-
fected virtuosos, between initiation, reflection, and performance), the other 
forms are all in different ways defined primarily in relation to separate exter-
nal objects. Khrêsis is competence in using external or reified objects as 
instruments or tools for the user’s purposes without any intention of changing 
the instruments themselves. It is an independent competence, as for example 
in driving a car. Car-driving is not a vague, insufficient, or applied form of 
some basic science in astronomical form (theôrêsis). In order to become a 
good driver, you do not need any of the other knowledge forms first. You do 
not have to be able to build or dismantle a car, nor to understand the princi-
ples of a carburettor engine or even more basic laws of physics. You need to 
practice in the specific relation as a user of this specific kind of thing. 
Khrêsis, or use, may not illuminate the most common concepts in current 
action research since most projects do not have such an instrumental relation-
ship to its field of study. But khrêsis is still possible and even prevalent in 
human relations. Some are even very good at using other people as instru-
ments for their own purposes (work life is even based on it through the 
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institution of wage labour). But khrêsis relations among human beings consti-
tutes a fundamental difference between users and used, and the ethics of 
using other people as instruments for achieving your own objectives is hard 
to defend generally.  
Poíêsis, or making, does relate directly to what is at stake in action re-
search, however. It is competence in manipulating external objects as mate-
rial according to the manipulator’s own plans and intentions, forming them 
and making something out of them. In poíêsis, movements and changes in the 
external object depend on us as knowers-manipulators. The change is not 
natural. The knower makes the changes according to preconceived plans in 
the knower’s mind. Hence, poíêsis clearly intervenes artificially in its mate-
rial, “going between” what would otherwise and “naturally” have happened 
to it. It creates or produces something from a material that depends on exter-
nal intervention. The product or result would not otherwise come to be. Trees 
do not become chairs, paper, or books naturally. A chair is made when a 
carpenter intervenes in the wood making changes according to his concepts 
and plans. Qua carpenter he is only interested in those aspects of wood 
relevant for making houses, tables, chairs, and other artefacts from it. His 
interest is not theoretical, and he needs very little botanical theory in order to 
become a good carpenter. 
But when such poíêsis relationships are transferred and inserted into hu-
man relations, they do not always look as attractive. As with khrêsis, the art 
of changing and manipulating others is hard to defend ethically on a general 
basis, although some people are good at it. The art of medicine is clearly an 
ethically justifiable case of poíêsis or intervention in relation to the human 
body aiming at correcting nature gone astray; restoring health. But as an art 
of rhetoric, persuading and seducing, poíêsis is also sold to business execu-
tives as techniques for making people do what you want, see things your way 
and support you, and work with you not against you etc., very useful e.g. in 
motivating employees and organisational members for implementing top-
down organizational changes. This, of course, indicates that intervening in 
human affairs has ethical aspects that must be considered, and conventional 
research ethics does so by requiring informed consent from research subjects. 
But the important point here is that this whole complex cannot simply be 
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reduced to a question of putting extraneous ethical constraints on technical 
and manipulative knowledge. It concerns kinds of knowledge and ways of 
knowing, carrying relational ethical or unethical import in themselves.  
Both khrêsis and poíêsis are based on technical calculation of effects in 
instruments and materials for reaching the aims of the actors. Their articula-
tion is tékhnê or “technique”. It works independently of any understanding by 
the ones subjected to treatment. When a specific cause is applied, certain 
effects can be calculated to follow. Technical relations can be mechanized 
through technology. Both khrêsis and poíêsis relate to external things, even to 
human beings in organisations, communities, families, and as individuals as 
external objects, as tools or instruments for use or as material for manipulat-
ive “making” or “conditioning”. Both khrêsis and poíêsis employ means 
(instruments, tools) that are different formally and in kind both from the 
starting point and from the end or objective of the act. Both have their aims in 
a product outside the technical activities in themselves. Unlike praxis, they 
are both heterotelic, meaning that their end is a separate object, state, or 
objective presumably achieved when using (formally different external 
instruments) and making (from external material) have stopped. Although 
modern jargon tends to conflate all of these terms confusingly into “practice”, 
this makes khrêsis and poíêsis different from praxis in important ways. But 
good or adequate “practice” is not simply “what works”. As indicated above, 
many different things may work, and they may work in quite different ways. 
The conventional experiment in natural science is clearly a variety of 
poíêsis, that interferes and intervenes in natural processes in controlled ways 
and applies different treatments in order to detect and clarify cause-effect 
relationships (cf. Hacking, 1983). It intervenes consciously in whatever it 
studies by applying presumed causes in order to produce effects. Although in 
a scientific experiment, the point is not really to reach specific manipulated 
results but to generate general knowledge, the kind of knowledge generated is 
of a poiêsis kind, in habitus-conformity with manipulative purposes, i.e. 
applying specific causes as stimuli to produce specific effects. A fully 
fledged discussion of this is beyond the scope of this text, however, since it 
requires a broad discussion of different kinds of causes. It is a well known 
historical fact that modern science started by focusing almost solely on what 
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Aristotle called the “efficient cause” (immediately preceding and releasing an 
effect as with one marble hitting another) and discarded the others (material, 
final, and formal causes). In human relations efficient causes are often re-
duced to “external” causes (pushing and pulling, using “carrot” and “whip” 
as reward and punishment) providing treatments as if they were medicines 
that work without requiring or involving any adequate understanding of the 
causes (i.e. of what is happening to them) by the receivers of treatment. The 
treatment works even for those who don’t understand why and how? This 
one-dimensional causal focus is basically continued in the quasi-experimental 
tradition from Campbell (Cook & Campbell, 1979: 25-36). But professional 
competence and mastery does not work without the practitioner understand-
ing how and why. 
Apprenticeship learning as praxis 
Skills, virtues, and professional disciplines, either individual or collective, 
e.g. skills in research methods, can hardly be produced by material and 
efficient causes like those above. Can novices be initiated into a professional 
or vocational community or community of practice by means like these 
alone; stimulated, motivated, manipulated? Can people achieve the responsi-
ble, independent, and autonomous thinking and acting of “Mündigkeit”, 
presupposed by every modern legal system, merely by being conditioned 
through external means like these? It is really a contradiction in terms. What 
has been said above about praxis reintroduces final causes, and even more 
centrally; formal causes to theory (theôría).8 As indicated above, “native 
ways of knowing” are subconsciously presupposed without being explicitly 
recognised, thematised, and integrated within mainstream approaches to 
science. I have argued elsewhere (Eikeland, 2006c) that the relationship 
between researchers and practitioners in relevant fields of study could and 
should be modelled on a dynamic relationship between masters and appren-
tices (already alluded to above) not on a static complementarity comparable 
to the relationship between parts of a machine or a jigsaw puzzle, or between 
                                           
8  Cf. Eikeland, 2008 for a fuller treatment 
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fixed roles in a social system, not on a relationship of manipulating external 
objects (khrêsis and poíêsis), and not even on a didactic relationship of 
instruction. This dynamic master-apprentice relationship is already implicitly 
present in the well known action research and action learning cycles of 
reflection and action. Who, then, are masters, and who the apprentices?  
In a relationship like this, field participants (communities, organizations, 
families, individuals) are not external moving objects to be described, pre-
dicted, and explained, nor are they material to be formed and changed, or 
instruments to be used, nor are they strangers to merely visit and report “back 
to base” about. Nor are they partners in a team with merely specialized, 
partial, and complementary roles and tasks. All of these relationships are 
possible, of course, and in certain cases quite legitimate. But becoming a 
member of a collegial community of professional, vocational, or cultural 
practice requires a process of initiation into a common and shared universe of 
the autonomous mastery and independent knowledge and understanding 
needed in order for individual practitioners to perform competently in specif-
ic situations. If theory and practice, thinking and doing, reflecting and per-
forming, are to be united, the same people must participate in both, in alter-
nating, cyclic, phases and levels of the same process, as in action research 
cycles alternating between reflecting and performing within open, experi-
menting, collaborative, research processes. Masters and apprentices go 
through the same initiating processes over and over, together, bringing them 
all closer to mastery through practice and through a learning, inquiring 
dialogue. The master-apprentice relationship must be a dynamic learning 
relationship based on full sharing of knowledge and competence, because it is 
designed to make a master of the apprentice.  
Although masters might teach systematically, instruct didactically, and 
“give orders”, most exchanges between masters and apprentices have to be 
more dialogical, based on questions and answers explicating what is going on 
and being done, how and why, here-and-now, in practice9. Masters and 
                                           
9  As a normative standard for learning relationships, apprenticeship implies more than 
the “undesigned” legitimate peripheral participation (LPP) and “learning-by-hanging-
around” of Lave & Wenger (1991). It needs the consciously designed reflective skholê 
as a precondition for critical, praxis-based dialogue. 
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apprentices share common standards for what they are doing, striving to 
attain the same general ends concerning mastery. Their performances and 
skills are at different distances in different directions from realising them, 
masters closer, apprentices farther away. Where you are, practically, in 
relation to standards of performance and the ability to articulate them, de-
cides whether you are a master or an apprentice, not fixed formal positions, 
titles, or distinctions. Within this relationship, the master is the servant of the 
other’s learning; a facilitator or catalyst of the other’s learning. If an unequal 
relationship is petrified as part of a social structure, it becomes static and 
conservative. But apprenticeship is not necessarily part of an unchanging, 
hierarchical, social structure as were the old apprenticeship institutions. Qua 
learning relationship it cannot be, since formally locked positions of authority 
and subordination are detrimental to the “masterly” autonomy to be learned. 
Hence, the core learning relationship comes more appropriately to its own 
when liberated from fixations to social structure and status. Both the dyna-
mism and the commonality within it are emphasised when underscoring that 
the role of master and apprentice is not formally determined nor permanently 
allocated between participants. It changes and alternates continuously. It 
rotates, increasingly as advanced levels are attained and a community of 
peers emerges. Everyone involved in the relationship are on their way, at 
different places along the same or similar way, changing, moving, and trans-
forming, approaching the same or similar standards of performance through 
practice and critical dialogue generating insight and understanding. In such a 
liberated apprenticeship everybody’s prejudices are on trial all the time, 
through a searching and inquiring dialogue, as Plato’s Socrates pointed out a 
long time ago. Those who know the most and best in practice, or those who 
provide the better arguments, are “masters”. Authority, roles, and tasks are 
not predetermined. 
In building capacity for organisational learning in organisations (as a de-
velopment task), the objective is to transfer and re-locate analytical research 
and learning skills to the others, but not merely didactically (cf. Eikeland & 
Berg, 1997; Eikeland, 2008). The apprentices must be fully initiated into all 
the “secret” tricks of the trade, although through several stages and levels. All 
other relationships, modeled on other relational ways of knowing stop short 
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at the threshold of fully initiating people into mastery of any art or discipline. 
But there cannot be a permanent division of labour. An apprentice does not 
have a partial or complementary role. S/he is on the way to mastery, as is the 
master. 
As indicated above, though, most research practices are still forced to 
work within given institutional divisions of labour between roles as “insid-
ers” and “outsiders”. How could professional researchers be “masters”, while 
the natives are apprentices, without reproducing verbally or practically the 
pitfalls of separate institutional roles and technical team-work divisions of 
labour, of externalised technical and instrumental relationships, and of di-
dactic, top-down instruction? Presumably, researchers know the pitfalls of 
methodology and philosophy of science as well as the reflective methods of 
methodology. The general aspects of observing, questioning, and experiment-
ing (trying out things) are things all practitioners observing and categorizing 
need to know in order to act competently. It is part of any reflective mastery’s 
competence. And so is the critical dialogue needed to articulate and external-
ise patterns in practices. Masters and apprentices are members of the same 
community of inquiry. Since not even masters are perfect, the common way 
of progress constitutes the community, i.e. they all have the learning and 
inquiring way of relating to their own practices and to each other, in com-
mon. An apprentice is a trainee, and we are all permanently apprentices, but 
alternate as masters. The common way of developing an emerging mastery 
constitutes the real community. 
Hence, a group of “masters” and “apprentices”, released from being part 
of a social structure, is a group of peers, and a community of inquiry 
(Torbert, 1976). Participants may have complementary fields of activity and 
expertise, substantially different. Still, in the way of researching and inquir-
ing into these complementary experiences, the specific processes and activi-
ties of inquiry, they are still peers; similar or alike. Experts in processes of 
inquiry are masters some times, having a greater knowledge and awareness of 
pitfalls of methodology and reflection, while experts in substantial arts or 
fields of activity are masters at other times, carrying in their own embodied 
experience and habitus the criteria for deciding the appropriateness of emerg-
ing conceptualisations. 
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The merging of research processes with practices, and the open sharing 
among participants in the inquiry, is also what constituted action research in 
the forties, perforating and breaking down the distinction between researchers 
and researched. The aim of becoming like the other (master) in certain re-
spects (skills, knowledge, and understanding) is what constitutes apprentice-
ship. It is by exploring and developing these relations that the relationship 
between “researchers” and “practitioners” can become a praxis community. 
Grasping and comprehending one’s own practices individually and collec-
tively as knowers-actors, improving one’s practices individually and collec-
tively, contextualizing one’s practices, and articulating it all as theôría and 
more adequate and wider understanding, is not intervening technically, 
creating artificial changes by applying external causes. It is more appropriate-
ly called development, more similar to a therapeutic non-intervention against 
subjects, protecting them against interferences and interventions from ob-
structing surroundings and extraneous influences. Extraneous obstructions 
and influences intervene as efficient causes. Bringing our own practices to 
consciousness, making us see things previously invisible, in order to perfect 
them, does not. 
Unfolding developments and emerging patterns differ from interventions, 
then. They approximate the Aristotelian relationship between praxis (doing 
something), and eupraxía (doing it well). A sprouting bud or blooming 
flower does not intervene into its former way of being. It fulfils it. Stopping 
the bud is intervention! Masters provide practical forms as elucidations of a 
model. Apprentices approximate and train themselves into the same form or 
pattern by imitation, experimentation, dialogue, and supervision, not striving 
to become identical to a particular master but to what “shines through” the 
masterly practice. The form or pattern of a common standard, “die Sache”, 
“saken”, or the “what-it-means-to-do-or-be-something”, is separable as 
reflectively reified in thinking, and, as such, separate from any individual 
master. It is common to, shared, and held in common by masters and appren-
tices through critical dialogue. When apprentices apprehend it , when they 
“get it” , they develop into masters autonomously, without interventions. 
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Summary and conclusion 
The common denominator for both forms of epistêmê in table 1, is that they 
are both non-interventionist and theory-directed. Neither one is practical in 
the sense of being directed at the generation of specific, singular actions of 
any kind. The second one, theôría, is action based, however, like grammar. 
Although it is directed towards developing theôría and general competence, 
it is necessarily developed from a base in acquired practical experience. 
Theôría is generated from within practice, training, exercise, and habituation. 
It emerges from the habitus engendered through accumulated practical 
experience (empeiria) as an articulation of its forms and patterns (sifting 
differences and similarities). Its primary source is praxis1, but since praxis1 is 
inherent in all the other ways of knowing as well, it includes all the action-
based knowledge forms khrêsis, poíêsis, praxis, and even theôrêsis consid-
ered from the “inside” as activities or disciplines. The ways of knowing differ 
in their relationship to what is known, but the fact that there is a praxis-aspect 
internal to all, makes praxis more generalisable and universal. Each way of 
knowing has its habitus specific to its particular relation to what is known 
and to its particular structure of means and ends. Hence, transferring a poíêsis 
habitus or a theôrêsis habitus to a context requiring praxis, produces a certain 
habitus-invalidity, and similar difficulties appear in attempts at translating 
theôrêsis based knowledge into “actionable” knowledge10. But this appears to 
be exactly what modernist social science has done in emulating natural science 
uncritically (still living in its wake), and in mistaking technique for praxis. 
Praxis2 and phrónêsis as practical reasoning are both action-based and ac-
tion-directed, then, and so are the intermediate knowledge forms in the table 
(except páthos). Praxis regulates relations among some “us” having an equal 
and collegial relationship to standards of conduct that some “we” have in 
common. But in human relations both theôrêsis and the other intermediate 
forms regulate relations between some “us” as knowers and some outsiders 
                                           
10  Cf. Eikeland & Nicolini (2011) for how most of the so-called practical turn in organi-
sation studies is still only (qualitative) theôrêsis knowledge producing a host of validi-
ty challenges. 
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known, objectified as “the others”. The known is separate from the 
knower(s). In a way, theôrêsis creates and requires total ideal apartheid. 
Where we cannot communicate or interact with whatever we study, as with 
stars and planets, this may be the only possibility. But reducing social knowl-
edge to this form is unnecessary, artificial, and highly problematic.  
While current mainstream social research has mostly abandoned experi-
mentation, action research springs historically from experimental psychology 
and social research. But although mostly modelled on poíêsis, experimenta-
tion does not have to be poíêsis. It could be either khrêsis or praxis, and it 
could be qualitative and concept-generating rather than conventionally meas-
uring and hypothesis-testing (Wartofsky, 1968; Dingler, 1952). In addition, a 
praxis-based experiment would not be based on manipulating others (organi-
sations, communities, families, individuals, etc.) by applying material and 
efficient causes to them as treatments. It would be based on experimenting,  
trying things out, together, developing, perfecting, and articulating common 
practical patterns and forms, collective, interactive, and individual, thereby 
transforming organisational and social research from theôrêsis, and from 
poíêsis-tékhnê, to praxis-theôría constituting the basis for operational, practi-
cable knowledge. Praxis requires sharing and communicating minds in a 
dynamic community of masters and apprentices. Everyone thereby becomes 
an experimenter, not an “experimentee”. 
This whole perspective, then, is what I claim becomes conceptually con-
cealed, excluded, obscured, and even distorted when talking too much about 
action research as “interventions” and “applied research”. The development 
of praxis and theôría cannot be reduced to this. This aim is even insuffi-
ciently served by quasi-essentialising action research as a “collaborative” or 
“interactive” relationship between researchers and practitioners within a 
division of labour where the contributions from both researchers and practi-
tioners are unanalysed as to forms of knowledge and ways of knowing pro-
vided. As I started by writing, none of these activities or relationships is bad 
in itself. And, probably, none can be completely avoided or abandoned. They 
are all institutionally necessary for different purposes and occasions, and 
unanalysed mixtures abound. But although ways of collaborating can be 
praxis-based, normally these standard ways of speaking do not adequately 
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capture the potentials for praxis and theôría as long as they operate with 
insiders and outsiders in a division of labour. Native, practitioner research 
opens the door for praxis research although it is often reduced (at least termi-
nologically) to the implementation of conventional research by practitioners 
and insiders in work-places and organisations. Describing action research as 
interventions should be related and maybe even restricted to poíêsis and 
tékhnê, applying efficient causes to individuals, families, and organisations 
and even whole societies. Large scale political measures based on established 
and conventional economic science and on experimental and quasi-
experimental behavioural science attempt this by applying causes, trying to 
stimulate or discourage certain kinds of behaviour in certain directions. 
Sometimes such measures even “work” according to their own intentions! 
But action research should not be reduced to this, and action research needs 
to be clearer about how it differs and how it aims to produce different kinds 
of knowledge. 
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